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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2104
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4178
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 9929
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 4780
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 9893
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 4525
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2766
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0958
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001689

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS HOME MINISTER/CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
SITAULA THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE COULD BE AT RISK

REF: KATHMANDU 1678

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Warning Against Maoists Entering Government Before Giving Up
Violence

¶1. (C) In a June 27 meeting, the Ambassador cautioned Government of Nepal (GON) chief negotiator and Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula that if the Maoists came into government without committing to give up violence irrevocably and permanently giving up their weapons, the USG would have to cut off assistance to the GON. The Ambassador further warned Sitaula that, if the Maoists entered the government without having given up their weapons, they would almost certainly take over the GON sooner rather than later. The Ambassador suggested that the GON should make it clear that the Maoists could not keep their weapons and enter government. He stressed to Sitaula that the GON had the support of the international community and the Nepali people.

Managing Maoist Weapons

¶2. (C) Sitaula emphasized that if the United Nations monitored Maoist arms and soldiers, the issue would be settled. Defining "management" of arms was critical, he said. The Ambassador recommended the GON focus on reaching an agreement about management of weapons that eliminated people's fear that the Maoists would use violence against them. Sitaula stated that the seven parties were discussing arms management and were looking at confining all Maoist cadre to different places around the country (not one central place). Subsequently, the UN should monitor the weapons and armies. He noted that the GON would be able to record the Maoists' biographical data. The Ambassador reiterated that the GON needed to assure people that the Maoists would not get their weapons back.

¶3. The GON's negotiator admitted that it was "very hard" to convince the Maoists to give up violence, but the GON was trying to bring them into the political process. Sitaula added that he remained hopeful because he believed most Maoists were trying to enter the political mainstream. He

said that there were splits among the Maoists that were making it difficult for the top leadership to convince lower-level cadre to abandon violence. The Ambassador cautioned him that Maoist leaders could be using purported difficulties within the party merely as an excuse to justify continuing extortion, threats, and intimidation. Home Secretary Umesh Prasad Mainali noted that the cease-fire

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monitoring committee would start work June 27 and hoped that monitoring would lead to a decrease in objectionable activity by the Maoists.

Comment

¶4. (C) The Ambassador made clear to the GON's chief negotiator the potential price the GON would have to pay if it allowed the rebels to enter government before giving up violence. Sitaula has been all over the map since the June 16 signing of the eight point agreement (reftel). We remain doubtful that he is the best lead negotiator for the GON. However, it appears he at least recognizes the critical issue of managing Maoist arms and that "managing weapons" includes ending Maoist ability to commit violence.
MORIARTY